Kentucky Law Survey: Criminal Law by Brice, Ellen Liebman & Taylor, Kenneth
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 5
1979





Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation




By ELLEN LIEBMAN BRICE* AND KENNETH TAYLOR**
INTRODUCTION
The authors of this survey article have taken the liberty of
departing from the traditional format of simply synopsizing a
year's worth of cases in a subject area. Instead, the Kentucky
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases decided during the
survey year which dealt with criminal law issues were read with
an eye toward selecting several specific problem areas deserv-
ing extensive research and comment. It is hoped that the in-
depth treatment given to those areas selected will compensate
for the lack of comprehensiveness inherent in this approach.
Section I represents an attempt to rationalize the Court's
recent decision upholding a murder conviction arising from an
automobile collision. Section II discusses the issue of what con-
stitutes a deadly weapon under the new penal code definition.
Section III analyzes that section of the rape statute dealing
with the mentally defective victim.
I.
On February 15, 1976, Danny Hamilton murdered Patsy
Ann Davidson. He didn't shoot, stab, or strangle her. On the
contrary, he didn't intend to harm her. In fact, he didn't know
of her presence in the vicinity of the crime immediately prior
to its occurrence. Nonetheless, a jury found that Hamilton had
acted wantonly and under "circumstances manifesting ex-
treme indifference to human life." Under the Kentucky Penal
Code such conduct is murder2 and a capital offense.'
There is little doubt that Hamilton's conduct was unrea-
sonable and posed a threat to human life. He was inebriated,
driving at a high rate of speed within the city limits, and was
* J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
** J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
The authors acknowledge the valuable assistance of Robert Gene Lawson, Profes-
sor of Law, University of Kentucky.
I Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 541 (Ky. 1978) (quoting Ky. RFv.
STAT. § 507.020(1)(b) (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 KRS § 507.020(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
3 KRS § 507.020(2) (Supp. 1978).
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recklessly dodging traffic in his path.' This extreme course of
conduct culminated in a fatal accident when Hamilton ignored
the red light at an intersection and collided with the victim's
automobile .'
While the extreme and outrageous nature of Hamilton's
conduct offends almost everyone's sense of propriety, his
"murder" conviction has undoubtedly raised some eyebrows.
The unlawfulness of his action is a foregone conclusion, but its
characterization as the highest degree of criminal homicide
does not enjoy such unanimity.' Is the result in Hamilton justi-
fiable, especially with the death penalty looming in the
background?
The inequitable result in Hamilton raises two questions.
The first question concerns the propriety of the jury verdict;
the second centers on the murder statute. If the jury was incor-
rect in finding both wantonness and extreme indifference to
human life, then Hamilton should have been convicted of sec-
ond degree manslaughter7 or reckless homicide.' On the other
hand, if the verdict was correct, the statute itself becomes sus-
pect. Perhaps the type of homicide described in KRS §
507.020(1)(b) should be defined as second degree murder or
included under first degree manslaughter. Maybe a distinction
in penalty should be made between wilful murders and unin-
tentional ones. Both suggestions will be examined in an at-
tempt to rationalize the Hamilton result.
To fully understand murder under KRS § 507.020(1)(b), it
is necessary to consider it in relation to Kentucky's statutory
framework of homicide. The 1975 Kentucky Penal Code re-
placed a myriad of special statutory homicide offenses' and a
Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 540-41 (Ky. 1978).
Id.
See notes 66-69 infra for various approaches to the classification of murders.
7 KRS § 507.040 (1975) (wantonly causing the death of another).
9 KRS § 507.050 (1975) (recklessly causing the death of another).
1 1952 Ky. Acts, ch. 51 (death occurring as a result of negligently operating a
motor vehicle); 1924 Ky. Acts, ch. 50, § 1 (amending 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 171, § 211)
(reckless shooting or throwing of missile into train, station, or motor vehicle); 1920 Ky.
Acts, ch. 100, § 8 (homicide occurring in the course of criminal syndicalism or sedi-
tion); 1910 Ky. Acts, ch. 58, § 3 (homicide occurring in the course of abortion); 1893
Ky. Acts, ch. 182, § 24 (homicide occurring in course of striking, stabbing, or shooting);
1892 Ky. Acts, ch. 42 (homicide resulting from obstruction of road).
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long line of court decisions defining various types of conduct as
homicide under a general statute' with a comprehensive
scheme which defines six types of homicide." These six types
of homicide comprise four offenses: murder 2 (two types), first
degree manslaughter" (two types), second degree manslaugh-
ter," and reckless homicide. 5
Upon examination of the six types of homicide it is appar-
ent that three of them (negligent murder, second degree man-
slaughter, and reckless homicide) are strikingly similar. It is
extremely difficult for the lay reader to discern an appreciable
difference between the mental states involved in each. Because
these three offenses are closely related they must be examined
together to understand the function of any one of them.
These three homicide offenses involve conduct creating a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk" that death will result. 6
The distinguishing factor between any two of these offenses is
the actor's mental state. Reckless homicide is committed by
acting recklessly,17 defined as the failure to perceive the risk of
death. Second degree manslaughter requires "wantonness", 19
defined as a conscious disregard of a known risk.20 Finally,
'0 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 90, § 1 (involuntary manslaughter); 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 182,
§ 22 (murder); 1893 Ky. Acts, ch. 182, § 23 (voluntary manslaughter).
"1 KRS § 507.020-.050 (1975).
12 KRS § 507.020(1)(a) provides that "[a] person is guilty of murder when with
intent to cause the death of another he causes the death of such person or of a third
person." The second type of murder, negligent murder, is defined as: "A person is
guilty of murder when under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another person and thereby causes the death of another person." KRS § 507.020(1)(b)
(1975).
'3 A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when with intent
to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; or with intent to cause the death of an-
other person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under
circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance. ...
KRS § 507.030(1)(a)-(b) (1975).
" Manslaughter in the second degree is defined by KRS § 507.040(1) as "wantonly
. . . [causing] the death of another person."
Is KRS § 507.050(1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of reckless homicide when,
with recklessness he causes the death of another person."
Is KRS § 501.020(3), .020(4) (1975).
17 KRS § 507.050 (1975).
2S KRS § 501.020(4) (1975).
KRS § 507.040 (1975).
2 KRS § 501.020(3) (1975).
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negligent murder results from a mental state which is both
wanton and extremely indifferent to human life.21 Extreme in-
difference to human life is not defined in the penal code.
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the nebulous
concept of "extreme indifference to human life" represents a
crucial determination. Exactly what type of conduct was con-
templated by the drafters of the penal code by this phrase? It
is generally understood that "extreme indifferences to human
life" was meant to incorporate into the murder statute the
widely recognized concept of the "depraved heart" killing, or
negligent murder, as it is sometimes called. 2 This concept is
found in the early English common law and has been picked
up by the common law of practically every American jurisdic-
tion.2 More recently it has been incorporated into the homicide
statutes of many states .2 The various American jurisdictions
have used different nomenclatures and have treated the of-
fense differently with regard to degree of homicide or severity
of punishment,26 but its recognition in some form is wide-
spread. 27 Because the concept of negligent murder is wide-
21 KRS § 507.020(l)(b) (1975). It should be noted that for any of these offenses
just discussed, the defendant's disregard of a known risk or failure to perceive the risk
must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe under the circumstances, KRS § 501.020(3) and (4) (1975). This
is designed to protect defendants who take chances for legitimate purposes, such as
driving fast to get an injured person to the hospital.
2 K. BRIcKEY, KENTUCKY CIMINAL LAW § 8.02 at 75 (1974); See R. MORELAND, LAw
OF HoMIcIDE 31-41, 213-16 (1952).
2R. MoRELAND, supra note 22, at 31.
24 Id.
21 E.g., killing with "implied malice," Hill v. State, 251 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 1969);
Cockrell v. State, 117 S.W.2d 1105, 1108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938); killing with
"universal malice," Langford v. State, 354 So.2d 297 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); death
resulting from doing an "eminently dangerous act," FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(2) (West
1976); killing which evinces a "depraved mind," ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 13-1-70 (1975);
killing which evinces "depraved indifference," People v. LeGrand, 402 N.Y.S.2d 209
(App. Div. 1978) and DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 635 (1974); "wanton and wicked disregard
for human life," Commonwealth v. Stock, 345 A.2d 654 (Pa. 1975); "depravity,"
Thomas v. United States, 419 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
26 See generally R. MORELAND, supra note 22, at 213-16 for a discussion of various
statutory treatments of this offense. Negligent murder has been treated as first degree
murder, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (1973), second degree murder, OKLA. STAT.




spread, its application in other jurisdictions sheds some light
on the present inquiry.
Before comparing Hamilton with other cases, however, it
is necessary to isolate and list the potentially controlling fac-
tors in the jury's determination that his behavior manifested
an extreme indifference to human life. Because driving an au-
tomobile is such a common act there is considerable difficulty
in determining the driver's mental state from his actions. Con-
sequently, any number of evidentiary facts, or even the defend-
ant's remorsefulness or demeanor at trial, could be influential
in the determination. However, for comparison purposes, as
well as for prediction of future fact patterns which will support
a verdict of murder on appeal, certain facts and circumstances
surrounding the Hamilton case can be listed.
Hamilton involved intoxication while driving, excessive
speed, recklessness while driving, and disregard of a traffic
signal. Also important was the fact that the collision occurred
at a downtown intersection.2 In addition, Hamilton's conduct
before and immediately after the accident may have been rele-
vant in determining his mental state at the time of the accident
since the Kentucky Supreme Court noted in its opinion that
Hamilton had been drunk and rowdy earlier that night and was
erratic and unremorseful after the accident.2
Characterizing certain vehicle-related killings as negligent
murder is not unprecedented, but rather is supported by a long
line of authority. 0 Logically, there is no reason to distinguish
an automobile from any other instrument of death. It is the
actor's mental state that should govern his culpability, not the
particular means used to kill. However, as the following cases
will demonstrate, different juries, presented with facts similar
to those in Hamilton, have reached different conclusions re-
garding the driver's mental state.
A case from the District of Columbia involving similar, but
probably more outrageous, conduct by the defendant was
Nesterlode v. United States.31 The defendant was extremely
intoxicated and drove "through traffic lights and at a reckless
560 S.W.2d at 540-41.
560 S.W.2d at 541.
See text accompanying notes 31-42 infra.
31 122 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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speed over the busiest thoroughfares in the City of Washing-
ton", striking and killing two pedestrians."2 The resulting sec-
ond degree murder conviction was upheld.
Two Georgia appellate decisions upheld murder convic-
tions resulting from the operation of an automobile where the
driver's actions were found to be "unlawful and. . . naturally
tending to destroy human life." In Wallace v. State3 the de-
fendant was intoxicated and driving rapidly when he struck
and killed a policeman on a motorcycle. The defendant in
Geter v. State, 35 while driving under the influence of alcohol,
crossed the yellow line just below the crest of a hill and at-
tempted to pass three cars, resulting in a head-on collision
which killed three persons.
For many years, Texas, like Kentucky, had one degree of
murder. However, unintentional killings could still result in a
murder conviction because malice could sometimes be inferred
from a "high degree of recklessness and disregard for the rights
of others. '" Such was the result in Cockrell v. State,'3 where
the defendant, while intoxicated, drove recklessly and at a high
speed, striking two pedestrians who were walking along the
highway.Y
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained a second de-
gree murder conviction in Commonwealth v. Taylor,3 where
the defendant struck two bicycle riders with his automobile. In
the court's words:
The intoxicated condition of the driver, the excessive rate of
speed which he was travelling, the distance the bodies and
bicycles were propelled upon impact, his awareness that this
was an area where children were likely to traverse, the ab-
sence of any physical or climatic condition which would ex-
plain or contribute to the happening of the accident and the
3 Id. at 59.
3 Geter v. State, 132 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1963).
31 115 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. 1960).
3 132 S.E.2d 30 (Ga. 1963).
3 Cockrell v. State, 117 S.W.2d 1105, 1108 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938).
117 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938).
3 Id. at 1106-07. See also Dorsche v. State, 514 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974); Duff v. State, 503 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Boening v. State, 422
S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
1, 337 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1975).
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appellant's failure to stop immediately after impact, all ex-
hibit the wickedness of disposition, the hardness of heart,
cruelty and recklessness associated with murder in the second
degree."
Other courts, however, have refused to uphold murder con-
victions, when presented with similar fact patterns. The Ala-
bama Supreme Court, in Langford v. State,4' held that
drunken, reckless driving alone will not support a first degree
murder conviction, despite the Alabama statute which in-
cludes the "depraved mind" killing in first degree murder.42
The court found that the defendant "determined only to drive
upon the highway after drinking. '43 There was no showing that
the defendant realized that death was likely to result.4
4
In an Arizona case, State v. Chalmers," the defendant's
speeding in the left lane resulted in a fatal head-on collision.
The court reversed a murder conviction saying that such con-
duct might constitute gross negligence and a disregard for the
safety of the defendant's passengers, but it did not evince "an
abandoned and malignant heart" so as to constitute murder."6
Two Georgia cases involving very similar conduct resulted
in reversals of murder convictions. In both Huntsinger v.
State" and Wright v. Statel" the defendants lost control of their
automobiles while attempting to negotiate a curve at an ex-
tremely high rate of speed and struck and killed pedestrians.
In both cases the Georgia Supreme Court overturned murder
convictions based upon allegations of an act which "naturally
tends to destroy the life of a human being."" In Huntsinger,
the court specifically held that the evidence did not support the
finding of such an act. In Wright, the court found in the record
sufficient evidence of the lawful operation. of the vehicle so as
" Id. at 548.
354 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1978).
42 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 13-1-70 (1975).
4 354 So.2d at 315.
" Id.
" 411 P.2d 448 (Ariz. 1966).
"Id.
,T 36 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. 1945).
141 S.E. 903 (Ga. 1928).
36 S.E.2d at 95, 100; 141 S.E. at 904, 905.
1978-791
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to make the failure to instruct the jury on involuntary man-
slaughter error.5 0 A Texas case, Freeman v. State,5' likewise
held that drunken, reckless driving was insufficient to support
a murder conviction where the defendant had been driving
while intoxicated and weaved across the road, causing a fatal
head-on collision.
Finally, an early Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v.
McLaughlin,52 is of interest here because of Hamilton's unre-
morseful behavior after the accident. In McLaughlin the Court
stated that despite the defendant's driving while intoxicated,
his courageous attempts to render aid to his victims after the
accident negated the imputation to him of a hardened heart. 3
In light of these cases, it is apparent that the verdict in
Hamilton is not unique or anomalous. Though it is clear that
the contrary result would find support in the case law, many
juries and courts have found that exaggerated disregard for
safety on the highways constitutes negligent murder.
Assuming that the jury's verdict in Hamilton conforms to
the present law of homicide, any remaining discomfort with the
decision must emanate from the law itself. Therefore, further
scrutiny should be directed toward the policy behind categoriz-
ing negligent murder as the most serious degree of homicide.
By providing for only one degree of murder, which includes
the depraved heart type of killing, Kentucky has followed the
lead of the Model Penal Code. "4 The justifications for this treat-
ment, given by the commentators to the Model Penal Code,
were incorporated into the Kentucky commentary to the mur-
der statute:
There is a kind of wanton homicide that cannot fairly be
distinguished . . . from homicides committed intentionally.
Wantonness ... presupposes an awareness of the creation of
substantial homicidal risk, a risk too great to be deemed jus-
tifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's conduct serves.
Since risk, however, is a matter of degree and the motives for
5 36 S.E.2d at 100; 141 S.E. at 905.
" 27 S.W.2d 162 (Tax. Crim. App. 1930).
52 142 A. 213 (Pa. 1928).
" Id. at 215.
5' Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 note (Baldwin 1975) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.2, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1960).
[Vol. 67
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risk creation may be infinite in variation, some formula is
needed to identify the case where wantonness should be as-
similated to intention. The conception that the draft employs
is that of extreme indifference to the value of human life.s
The original murder statute in the Kentucky Penal Code
provided for more severe punishments for some murders than
it did for negligent murder. The death penalty was reserved for
specifically enumerated murders,5" such as the intentional kill-
ing of a police officer 7 or prison guard." All other murders were
Class A felonies5 punishable by imprisonment for twenty years
to life.1' The distinction between capital and noncapital mur-
der did not rest solely upon the presence of an intent to kill,
but all enumerated capital murder offenses expressly required
such intent. In this manner the inadvertent killer was not sub-
ject to the death penalty."1 In 1976, this penalty distinction was
removed from the murder statute." Every murder became a
capital offense, even though alternative punishments, in addi-
tion to death, were provided for capital offenses." Today, negli-
gent murder is classified as the highest degree of homicide
under Kentucky law.
Kentucky is not the only jurisdiction to treat negligent
murder as the highest degree of homicide. Several states in-
clude the depraved heart killing within one degree of murder."
A few states with a bifurcated murder offense place negligent
murder under first degree murder. 5
Though Kentucky's classification of the depraved heart
murder as the highest degree of homicide is supported by the
Model Penal Code, and a number of other jurisdictions, it is
"Id.
u KRS § 507.020 (1975).
7
.3JRS § 507.020(f) (1975).
KRS § 507.020(c) (1975).
" 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 406, § 61 (repealed 1976).
KRS § 532.060(2)(a) (1975).
" 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, § 61 (repealed 1976).
62 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 183, § 1; 1976 Ky. Acts (Ex. Sess.) ch. 15, § 1.
KRS § 532.035 (Supp. 1978). Capital offenses are punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or a prison term in excess of 20 years.
"1 E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(2) (Supp. 1978). This subsection of the single
murder statute speaks in terms of conduct creating a strong probability of death, which
is generally equivalent to an imminently dangerous act or the depraved heart killing.
" E.g., ALA. CODE § 13-1-70 (1975); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(d).
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67
clearly a minority approach. Most jurisdictions treat such kill-
ings as second degree murder, either by statute"6 or by case
law 7 or by a combination of both." At least one jurisdiction
provides for this type homicide under a third degree of mur-
der."
The Hamilton case should awaken the state legislature to
the potential for excessive penalty for reckless and wanton con-
duct charged and prosecuted under subsection (1)(b) of the
murder statute. The verdict in Hamilton is defensible, espe-
cially in light of the jury's moderation in awarding a prison
sentence. However, the case brings into focus the significance
of the undefined legal phrase "extreme indifference to human
life." The concept may prove too much for an unbridled jury
to deal with judiciously. The depraved heart killing should not
be a capital offense and would be better placed into a new,
separate second degree of murder.
II.
The construction of "deadly weapon" for purposes of cer-
tain criminal offenses has been consistent since Merritt v.
Commonwealth7" was decided in 1965. 71 There the Kentucky
61 This approach is characterized by a statutory scheme in which murder is bifur-
cated into degrees and second degree murder consists of, among other things the
"depraved mind" or "cruel, wicked, and depraved indifference" killings. E.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 11, § 635 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2) (1976) (This section specifically
includes the doing of an "imminently dangerous act evincing a depraved mind regard-
less of human life" in second degree murder.); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.316 - 750.317
(1970); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 701.8(1) (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1977); Wisc.
STAT. § 940.02 (Supp. 1978).
11 In this approach only one degree of murder is provided for by statute, but case
law has supplied the bifurcation with the depraved heart killing being placed with
second degree murder. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 187-188 (West 1970); People v. Wallace,
37 P.2d 1053 (Cal. 1935); People v. Butts, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1965).
" This approach is typically characterized by a bifurcated murder statute based
upon the presence or absence of premeditation or malice. As at common law, first
degree murder is defined as killing with malice and premeditation. Second degree
murder is killing with malice but without premeditation. By case law, these jurisdic-
tions have construed the depraved heart killings as involving "implied malice" but
because there exists no premeditation, the offense is second degree, not first degree,
murder. E.g., Thomas v. U.S., 419 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Hill v. State, 251 N.E.2d
429 (Ind. 1969); D.C. CODE § 22-2403 (1973); IND. CODE § 10-3404 (Supp. 1975).
" MiNN. STAT. § 609.195 (Supp. 1978).
386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965).
7' In a case which followed soon after Merritt, the Court apparently ignored it and
KENTUCKY LAW SuRVEY
Court of Appeals, in defining a "deadly weapon," said that
"any object which is intended by its user to convince the victim
that it is a pistol or other deadly weapon and does so convince
him is one. 72 Kentucky's high court, now the Kentucky Su-
preme Court, posited in 1977 that the definition of "deadly
weapon" was well settled and that it was "not disposed to
belabor this question further."7 3
When the new penal code took effect in 1975, the law of
deadly weapons changed, at least literally. The statutory
scheme now includes a definitional section in which seven cate-
gories of weapons are delineated as deadly per se,74 including
"any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing
death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged."75
Thus it appears that the legislature has rejected Merritt and
mandated that a toy pistol is not a deadly weapon. However,
a palpable contradiction exists because the Commentary to the
Final Draft of the Penal Code stresses that the legislature in-
tended to leave Merritt intact.7 Consequently, the Court has
relied heavily upon this language in recent cases to justify its
continued adherence to Merritt.7 Before a proper analysis of
based its decision on prior law. In a trial for carrying a concealed deadly weapon, there
was conflicting testimony as to whether the pistol in question would fire. Although the
Court bad rejected the importance of this factor in Merritt, it held that "there was
sufficient evidence to generate a belief as well as disbelief that the pistol would fire.
Consequently, it was the duty of the court to give an affirmative defense instruction."
Stevens v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Ky. 1966). The Stevens court made
no mention of Merritt, possibly because Merritt limited its holding to the robbery
statute. However, it will be demonstrated that this distinction is no longer made.
72 Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727,729 (Ky. 1965). The victim was only
able to testify that the robber displayed "what appeared to be a pistol," and the Court
acknowledged that it might have been a "toy or simulated weapon rather than a deadly
weapon in fact." Id. at 728-29.
73 Mishler v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Ky. 1977).
' KRS § 500.080(4) (Supp. 1978).
73 Id.
' In describing what constitutes a "deadly weapon," the Court of Ap-
peals recently ruled that any object can be a deadly weapon if intended by
its user to convince a victim that it is deadly and if the victim is in fact
convinced. Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965). In that
case, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery despite the fact that the
"weapon" he used may have been a toy pistol. There is no intention to
change this decision through the provisions of this chapter.
LEoIsLATivE RESEARCH COMMISSION, KENTUCKY PENAL CODE, Final Draft, Commentary
181 (1971).
" E.g., Hicks v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1977); Kennedy v. Com-
monwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1977).
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the post-1975 cases may be made, however, it is necessary to
consider the historical development of the law of deadly weap-
ons.
78
Approximately thirty years ago in Jarvis v.
Commonwealth,71 Kentucky's highest court construed the
deadly weapon requirement of the statute prohibiting carrying
such a weapon concealed on the person. The weapon in ques-
tion was one without a cylinder, and hence incapable of firing.
The Court, persuaded by cases from a number of other jurisdic-
tions, concluded that "the better view" is "that a pistol or
revolver without an essential part, and consequently incapable
of being used as a firearm, is not a deadly weapon."" Several
years later, in Couch v. Commonwealth,81 it was argued that
Jarvis mandated that the Commonwealth must prove that the
pistol was in working order as part of its case in chief. The
Court disagreed. It held that "[a] pistol is a deadly weapon
per se" and that the defective condition of the gun is "an af-
firmative defense which the defendant [is] called on to
prove. 8 2 Thus the Court broadened Jarvis to mean that a
deadly weapon must in fact be deadly, but it will be presumed
to be so unless shown to be otherwise by the accused.
The first serious modification of this construction ap-
peared six years later in Commonwealth v. Harris.83 In Harris,
although the weapon was indeed capable of firing, it was not
loaded, nor was the defendant in possession of any ammunition
at the time. Recalling its decision in Jarvis, the Court distin-
guished a "firearm incapable of being fired for want of ammu-
nition" from one "incapable of being fired because of mechani-
cal defects. 84 It decided that the former is clearly within the
category of weapons which the statute intends to deter people
from carrying, since the gun was "mechanically capable of pro-
"' Kentucky law on this subject has not developed solely in cases involving armed
robbery. The courts have also considered the issue in cases of carrying a concealed
deadly weapon, borrowing the definition from the robbery cases. Both types of cases
will be examined as they relate to the issue of what constitutes a deadly weapon.
206 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1947).
Id. at 833.
" 255 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1953).
2Id. at 479.
- 344 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1961).
" Id. at 821.
[Vol. 67
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ducing death upon being fired.""5 The Court consequently held
the weapon to be a deadly one. The standard of Jarvis was
changed from "deadly at the time" to "having the capacity to
become deadly," with the actual ability to cause death still
being required.
Then, in 1965, Merritt v. Commonwealth"' was decided.
Although there was conflicting evidence at trial as to whether
the appellant used a real or toy gun in perpetrating the crime,
he was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. His attorney argued that the court should have
instructed on simple robbery because the jury might have
found that Merritt used only a simulated weapon. Judge Pal-
more, writing for the Court, did not discuss prior law, but
adopted the position that the subjective view of the victim
controls as to the nature of the instrument used. 7 Since
Merritt, the subjective construction of "deadly weapon" has
been applicable to arguably all offenses that involve such an
element.8 When most strictly applied it has been relied upon
to support a conviction for armed robbery, where the victim
testified that something sharp, which he never saw but pre-
sumed was a knife, was held against his back.8' The actual
nature of the object used is no longer relevant; the crucial
question is the belief of the victim."0
Ten years after Merritt, Kentucky's criminal law changed
radically. The common-law system was replaced by a compre-
hensive code fashioned to a significant extent after the Model
Penal Code. Under the Kentucky Penal Code armed robbery
became robbery in the first degree:
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in
the course of committing theft, he uses or threatens the im-
mediate use of physical force upon another person with intent
to accomplish the theft and when he:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime; or
"Id.
- 386 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1965).
" Id. at 729.
u For the one exception to this rule, see note 71 supra.
, Travis v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 481 (Ky. 1970).
" See, e.g., Styles v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1974).
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(b) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
(c) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
instrument upon any person who is not a participant in the
crime."'
As noted above, there is also a statutory definition to be read
in conjunction with this section. It defines a deadly weapon as:
(a) Any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of
producing death or other serious physical injury, may be dis-
charged; or
(b) Any knife other than an ordinary pocket knife or
hunting knife; or
(c) Billy, nightstick, or club; or
(d) Blackjack or slapjack; or
(e) Nanchaku karate sticks; or
(f) Shuriken or death star; or
(g) Artificial knuckles made from metal, plastic or
other similar hard material.9 2
This legislation exhibits several substantial changes from
the common law. 3 A literal reading of the statute evidences a
modification in the area of deadly weapons. However, the draf-
ters of the Penal Code carefully specified that "[tihere is no
intention to change [the Merritt] decision through the provi-
sions of this chapter." 9' The apparent conflict between the stat-
ute and the commentary has caused uncertainty and litigation.
For example, a recent opinion issued by the Office of the Attor-
ney General indicated that the listing of deadly weapons in the
statute is intended to be exhaustive.95 Moreover, the Court's
" KRS § 515.020 (1975).
12 KRS § 500.080(4) (Supp. 1978).
'3 For an explanation of those changes which are related to the discussion at hand,
see CRIMINAL LAW OF KENTUCKY ANNOTATED 774 (1975).
" Commentary, supra note 76, at 181. This result was proposed as early as 1968
by the Kentucky Crime Commission, which recommended that "[ilmitation pistols
should be specifically covered and their use punished to the same extent as deadly
weapons." KENTUCKY CRIME COMMISSION, 1 OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED CRIMINAL LAW
REvIsION, Commentary 25 (1968).
,1 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 75-451 (1975). The question considered was whether the
Nanchaku, an instrument consisting of two pieces of wood fastened at the ends by a
cord, sometimes referred to as karate sticks, is a "deadly weapon." The opinion states
that "deadly weapon" "is a quite limited term under the Code and includes only those
six items listed in the definition." Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in original). Although the
opinion is directed toward an inquiry regarding the concealed deadly weapon statute,
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continued application of Merritt has been criticized and chal-
lenged."
The Kentucky Supreme Court has steadfastly applied the
rule of Merritt subsequent to the enactment of the Kentucky
penal code. The Court's first opportunity to affirm Merritt oc-
curred in Kennedy v. Commonwealth.7 In that case, an un-
loaded pistol with a broken firing pin, incapable of firing a shot,
was used by the defendant in a robbery. Defense counsel
argued that such a pistol could not technically constitute a
deadly weapon within the terms of the statute and that the
statute overruled Merritt." The Court recognized that such a
reading is plausible if the statute is taken out of context. How-
ever, the Court found that because the Penal Code Commen-
tary is a proper aid in construction of statutory material," rele-
vant portions of the Commentary may alter a literal reading of
the statute. Accordingly, because the Commentary specifically
"saves" the Merritt decision, ' the Court held that Merritt "is
as viable now as it was prior to the adoption of the code." '
The soundness of the Kennedy decision was immediately
challenged. In Little v. Commonwealth,1 12 defense counsel
argued that the Court's interpretation "represents an unconsti-
tutional encroachment upon the power of the Legislature to
specifically and definitively delineate the kinds of weapons
which are 'deadly' under the Penal Code." ' 3 The Court disa-
greed and affirmed Little's armed robbery conviction, although
there was no evidence that the weapon used was capable of
firing. ' Dismissing the defendant's interpretation, it stated
it is indicated therein that the list is exclusive as to any provision in the Code.
It is interesting to note that KRS § 500.080 was amended in 1978 to specifically
include the Nanchaku as a deadly weapon. KRS § 500.080(4) (Supp. 1978).
" E.g., Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1977); Little v. Com-
monwealth, 550 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. 1977).
17 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1977).
11 Id. at 220.
" KRS § 500.100 (1975).
10 See note 76 supra for the text of the Commentary.
,0 544 S.W.2d at 221 (Ky. 1977).
,n 550 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. 1977).
'" Id. at 494.
' The Court suggested that defense counsel's argument "stretches the bounds of
credulity" and stated that "[i]t appears from counsel's argument that in order for
[Little] to have had a fair trial it would have been incumbent upon the trial court to
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that the effect of Kennedy "is to construe the definition of
'deadly weapon' under KRS 500.080(4) as including the words,
'whether real or simulated,' in accordance with Merritt."105 If
there had been any'doubt about the extent of the holding in
Kennedy, it is now clear; the Merritt definition applies to all
sections of the Penal Code involving deadly weapons. 1°1
Fruitless attacks on the Court's position have continued in
the past few years. 17 In Helpenstine v. Commonwealth,"'8 it
was argued that where the trial court applies the
Merritt/Kennedy rule to an offense which occurred prior to the
decision in Kennedy, the effect is an ex post facto application
of the law. The Court rejected this theory on the grounds that
the decision in Kennedy followed logically from the premise of
Merritt, and that neither case is an example of "judicial legis-
lation." ' 9 Defense counsel in Helpenstine further claimed that
instructing the jury that the pistol used is a deadly weapon as
a matter of law serves to shift the burden of proof to the defen-
dant on an essential element of the crime.110 The Court was
similarly unimpressed by this approach. It found that the bur-
den remains on the Commonwealth, and that the Common-
wealth did satisfy the burden."'
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court is patently con-
vinced that Merritt retains its prior vitality, it has failed to
have each of the jurors fire the shotgun to see if it was operable." Id. This was in
response to the defendant's contention that the trial court should have allowed the jury
to determine if the shotgun was a "deadly weapon" for purposes of the statute. This
approach has failed to find acceptance. In Bishop v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 519
(Ky. 1977), the Court cited PALMORE AND LAwSON, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN KENTUcKY
(rev. ed. 1975), to support the proposition that an instruction regarding the alleged
deadly weapon need not be given to the jury. The determination is one of law to be
made by the trial court and Little was decided accordingly.
"1 550 S.W.2d at 494. See text accompanying note 92 supra for the text of the
statute.
10, KRS §§ 508.010(1)(a), .020(1)(b), .030(1)(b) (degrees of assault); KRS §§
511.020(1)(a)(1,), .030(1)(a) (degrees of burglary); KRS § 515.020(2) (firearm defined)
(1975). Cf. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. Summ. 5 (April 12, 1978), (applica-
tion of Merritt to the wanton endangerment statute).
'0 See, e.g., Hicks v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1977); Mishler v.
Commonwealth, 556 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1977).
' 566 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1978).
, Id. at 416-17.
,,0 For a discussion of how the Court has previously disposed of such a contention,
see note 104 supra.
"1 566 S.W.2d at 417.
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discover some serious inconsistencies in that position. When
the Court of Appeals decided Merritt, there was no statute
applying to deadly weapons per se; now there is. By construing
the definition of weapons to include the words "real or simu-
lated," the Court affects nine different sections of the Code
which require a uniform interpretation." 2 Moreover, the Code
no longer requires that the weapon be used or even brandished
to satisfy first degree robbery. While the former statute made
the use or display of "any pistol, gun or other firearm or other
deadly weapon" an element of first degree robbery, the new
statute requires only that a person be "armed with a deadly
weapon." ' Attaching the Merritt rule to the new statute thus
has the effect of broadening its application far beyond that
anticipated by the Merritt Court. Considering the subjective
belief of the victim requires that some effort be made to use the
weapon as if it were deadly. Now an offender "armed" with a
toy gun could conceivably be convicted of first degree robbery
even if it is never used by the defendant or seen by the victim."'
This result is unjustifiable.
The problem presented is not unique to Kentucky. It exists
in many jurisdictions and a survey of other states' solutions is
helpful in examining Kentucky's approach. Ten states employ
the common-law definition of robbery, which requires only that
the victim be put in fear, by whatever means."1 5 These jurisdic-
tions have no specific statutory provisions dealing with the use
of firearms.
However, the majority of states now have statutes which
require an objective determination of the existence of a deadly
weapon and provide an enhanced penalty when the offender is
actually armed with a real weapon. ' As noted by the Ohio
"1 See note 106 supra for a list of these statutes.
"' KRS § 433.140 (1966) (repealed 1974); KS § 515.020(b) (1975).
"' K. BRICKEY, KaErucKY CRMnNAL LAW § 15.02 (1974). The Court has not had
occasion to rule on such a case, but this situation clearly falls within the statute as
construed in Kennedy.
£,5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West) (1978 Compact Edition); IDAHO CODE § 18-6501
(Cum. Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. § 21-3701 (1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-401
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-324 (Supp. 1977); Nay. Rzv. STAT. § 200.380 (1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:141-1 (West) (1969); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701 (Purdon)
(Supp. 1978-1979); S.D. Comp. LAws ANN. § 22-30-6 (Supp. 1978); W.VA. CODE § 61-
2-12 (1977).
1M, ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.295 (1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.13(2)(a) (1976); HAw.
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Court of Appeals, the emphasis of such statutes is upon penalty
considerations: "We do not believe, in short, that the distinc-
tion between robbery and unarmed robbery may be made on
the basis of what the victim thinks or feels his attacker may
be wielding. Had the legislature intended this result, it could
easily have said so. '117
Nine state legislatures have so stated, however, and their
robbery statutes recognize something less than a weapon capa-
ble of inflicting death, emphasizing proof rather than penalty
considerations. Two of these states denote "any article fash-
ioned" as a deadly weapon or a "facsimile" thereof.118 Three
require only that the person "represent" the existence of such
a weapon, or "pretend" to be so armed."' The other four allow
"what appears to be" a deadly weapon to be treated as one.',"
These variations are essentially the statutory equivalent of the
Merritt decision.
Finally, there are seven states which, like Kentucky, have
statutes which appear to provide an objective standard, yet
have been construed by the courts of the state to require a
subjective analysis of the victim's belief.' For example, the
REV. STAT. § 708.840(2) (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 18-2 (Smith-Hurd) (1977);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-1 (Bums) (Cum. Supp. 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.2 (West)
(Special Pamphlet 1978); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 651 (Pamphlet 1978); MmN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.245 (West) (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-79 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40A-16-2 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.01 (Page) (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1287 (West) (Supp.
1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-47-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 16-11-330 (1976);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 608(b) (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.32 (West) (Supp. 1978-
1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-66 (1975).
,, State v. Matthews, 322 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
", MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.529 (1968), People v. Jury, 142 N.W.2d 910
(Mich. Ct. App. 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1977).
"' ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2102 (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-134, 135 (1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01 (1976).
IN DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 832(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.020
(Vernon) (Special Pamphlet 1978); N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 636.1 (Supp. 1973); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.56.200 (1976).
"I D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2901 (West) (1967), Meredith v. United States, 343
A.2d 317 (D.C. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1902 (1977), Pettiford v. State, 221 S.E.2d
43 (Ga. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:64 (West) (1974), State v. Sonnier, 317 So.2d
190 (La. 1975); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. Art. 27, § 488 (1976); Crum v. State, 227
A.2d 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 17 (Michie/Law Co-
op) (1968); Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 314 N.E.2d 448 (Mass. Ct. App. 1974); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 29.03 (Vernon) (1974); Walker v. State, 543 S.W.2d 634, 637
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Massachusetts armed robbery statute requires that a person be
"armed with a dangerous weapon."' ' However, the Massachu-
setts Court of Appeals has determined that the statute:
is intended to punish not merely those robbers who possess a
weapon dangerous in fact, but also those who possess a
weapon which gives the appearance of being dangerous, since
the fear felt by victims and bystanders and the danger to
public order resulting from their possible reactions are the
same in either case.12s
Thus, the Massachusetts court has applied the same gloss that
the Kentucky Supreme Court placed on the Kentucky statute
through the Merritt and Kennedy decisions. While the policy
bases expressed by the court above are persuasive, the reasoned
opinion of the Ohio court mentioned above should not be
wholly disregarded. Basing the punishment upon the degree of
danger actually caused by the defendant bears consideration.
The Model Penal Code adheres to this view, and deals with
the problem by eliminating the weapon issue. 1u The Commen-
tary explains:
The factor of being "armed with a deadly weapon," so com-
monly used to aggravate robbery under present statutes, has
been dropped in favor of the test in clause (b) of subsection
(1), which requires threat or menace of serious bodily harm.
Most cases of armed robbery will fall within this category.
Only where the robber does not exhibit his weapon would
clause (b) operate more narrowly than the armed robbery
statutes. We have concluded that it is the employment of a
weapon that should be significant in the grading of theft,
rather than the discovery, for example, of a switchblade knife
in the culprit's pocket. 125
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976); VA. CODE § 18.2-58 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Cox v. Common-
wealth, 240 S.E.2d 524, 525 (Va. 1978).
I" MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 17 (Michie/Law Co-op) (1968).
' Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 314 N.E.2d 448, 450 (Mass. Ct. App. 1974).
2I2 (1) Robbery Defined. A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course
of committing a theft, he:
(a) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; or
(b) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate
serious bodily injury; or
(c) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first
or second degree.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
I" Id. (footnote omitted).
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A few states have adopted novel approaches to this prob-
lem, taking into account the real distinctions between crimes
involving a deadly weapon and those involving a non-deadly
one. The Oregon and New York statutes provide that a pur-
ported weapon, or an unworkable or unloaded weapon, satisfies
second degree robbery, but a real firearm capable of firing (or
a comparable weapon of another type) is required for first de-
gree robbery.' 2 Colorado's aggravated robbery provision simi-
larly requires that a person be armed with a weapon actually
capable of causing death. However, the statute provides some
evidentiary qualifications:
Possession of any article used or fashioned in a manner to
lead any person who is present reasonably to believe it to'be
a deadly weapon, or any verbal or other representation by the
defendant that he is then and there so armed, is prima facie
evidence ... that he was so armed.'17
Consequently, a person who is able to present evidence that the
article used was not deadly is entitled to have the trial court
instruct on simple robbery, which carries a substantially lower
penalty. 1'
In discussing the statute, the Colorado Supreme Court
explained:
The statute permits the jury to infer that the defendant ac-
tually possessed a deadly weapon when he has made such a
representation to another. In the light of common sense and
experience, the victim of a robbery-possessed of a reasona-
ble belief-may infer that a defendant possesses a deadly
weapon if the defendant makes such a representation. Cer-
tainly, nobody would require the victim to test this inference.
The jury, guided by the light of reason, is permitted, under
the statute, to draw the same inference, and the inference
may be used to support a finding of guilt under the statute.' 2
,n OR. Rav. STAT. § 164.415(1) (1977), State v. Poole, 572 P.2d 320 (Or. Ct. App.
1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.10 (McKinney) (1975).
'2' COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-302 (1973).
128 Under the Colorado law the penalty for aggravated robbery is five to forty years,
while simple robbery carries a penalty of one day or $1,000 to ten years or $30,000 or
both. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-1-105 (Cum. Supp. 1976). In Kentucky, comparable stat-
utes provide for ten to twenty years and five to ten years, respectively. KRS §
532.060(b), (c) (1975).
In People v. Lorio, 546 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Colo. 1976).
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Colorado's solution for dealing with deadly weapon cases is
consistent with the underlying policies. It provides protection
for the potential victim, in that the government need not prove
the actual character of the object used. Guilty persons will not
be acquitted because the prosecution is unable to produce the
weapon or prove that it is in working order. But it also protects
the accused by allowing the presumption to be rebutted by
competent evidence. The effect of the presumption is merely
to shift the burden of production of evidence, thus benefitting
the accused only when the presumption is not valid in the
particular situation.
Such an approach has been fashioned judicially in Tennes-
see. The Tennessee robbery statute employs a common-law
definition of simple robbery, but enhances the penalty when a
deadly weapon is used. Recognizing that a serious proof prob-
lem was created by the statute, the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that a prima facie case of armed robbery may be made out
on the basis of a victim's testimony, but an accused can defeat
this with competent evidence tending to show that the object
was not a deadly weapon. 13
It is clearly unreasonable to require the prosecution to
carry the burden of production on the issue of whether a partic-
ular weapon was used and whether it was capable of causing
death. Allowing the victim's testimony to satisfy and shift that
burden is an equitable alternative. However, relying solely on
the subjective belief of the victim when the accused is capable
of presenting evidence to the contrary is manifestly unreasona-
ble. An enhanced penalty cannot be justified where the vic-
tim's life was not in actual danger.
Alabama and Arizona have enacted statutes which are
similar to the Colorado statute and which will take effect this
year."' Tennessee's courts have interpreted its statute to reach
an identical result. Kentucky's judicial and legislative
branches would do well to reconsider their position in light of
these sound alternatives.
13 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Cum. Supp. 1978), Peabody v. State, 556 S.W.2d
547 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).





Much has been written recently about rape and its lasting
psychological effect on the victim. '32 Little has been said about
the effect that the victim's mental condition has upon her ca-
pacity to consent. In 1978, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was
confronted with this problem in Salsman v. Commonwealth. '3
The Salsman court traced the development of the law of con-
sent in rape cases, and discussed the changes brought about by
the new Penal Code. It relied upon the Commentary to the
Final Draft to support its holding, finding that the statute
should be construed more narrowly to protect fewer victims.
Whether this construction will be followed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court depends primarily upon its compatibility with
the policy bases of the statute.
In Salsman, the defendant was a delivery man; the victim
was a twenty-four year old mentally retarded woman.' 34 At
trial, the defendant admitted having intercourse with the vic-
tim, but denied that any force was used and argued that she
had consented. '35 The central issue was whether the victim pos-
sessed the legal capacity to consent.'36 In the Penal Code, lack
of consent is a specific element of all sexual offenses,'37 and one
who is "mentally defective" is considered incapable of giving
legal consent.1 3  According to the definitional section,
.'.[m]entally defective' means that a person suffers from a
132 S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975); L. SCHULTZ, RAPE VIMrIMOLOGY
(1975); D. NAss, THE RAPE Vicrmi (1977); J. MACDONALD, RAPE: OFFENDERS AND THEim
ViCTiMS (1971); E. HiLBERMAN, THE RAPE VICrm (1976).
1' 565 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
13 Id. at 639.
' Id. at 639-40.
13 This question is critical in determining which statute the defendant will be
prosecuted under. Rape in the first degree requires "forcible compulsion," while rape
in the third degree is satisfied by "intercourse with another person who is incapable
of consenting because [she) is mentally defective." KRS §§ 510.040(1)(a),
510.060(1)(a) (1975). Rape in the first degree is a Class B felony carrying a penalty of
ten to twenty years. KRS §§ 510.040(2), 532.060(2)(b) (1975). Rape in the third degree
is a Class D felony for which the sentence can range from one to five years. KRS §§
510.060(2), 532.060(2)(d) (1975). A similar distinction is found between sexual abuse
in the first and second degrees. KRS §§ 510.110(1)(a) (1975). The distinction is ob-
viously important to the accused.
' KRS § 510.020(1) (1975).
'lu KRS § 510.020(3)(b) (1975).
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mental disease or defect which renders [her] incapable of ap-
praising the nature of [her] conduct."' 39 The Court of Appeals
held that Salsman's victim was not mentally defective within
the meaning of this statute, and determined that "[t]he trial
court correctly concluded that Salsman could not be guilty of
either rape in the third degree or sexual abuse in the second
degree on the theory that the prosecutrix was incapable of giv-
ing consent."' 10
Trial testimony indicated that: (1) the victim "had the
reasoning capacity of a ten-year-old;" (2) "although she had a
degree of judgment and self-control, 'she [was] easily threat-
ened and frightened by tasks that [were] difficult for her;'"
and (3) "[i]n unusual circumstances, her judgment would be
impaired."'' However, these factors were considered irrelevant
by the court because a clinical psychologist testified that she
"was capable of understanding that a sexual act was being
performed upon her."' 42 While the statutory definition requires
that the victim be "incapable of appraising the nature of [her]
conduct,"' 43 the court concluded that "the sole question is
whether she is capable of appraising the nature of the sexual
act being performed."'44 It is suggested that these standards are
not interchangeable and that such construction may prove to
be contrary to the purpose of the statute.
The language of the Kentucky statute defining "mentally
defective" is drawn from the Model Penal Code.' 4' Under that
scheme, gross sexual imposition is a lesser degree of rape which
may be charged where the victim "suffers from a mental dis-
ease or defect which renders her incapable of appraising the
nature of her conduct."'46 The Commentary to the Model Penal
Code explains how this standard is to be applied:
Conditions affecting only the woman's capacity to "control"
herself sexually will not involve criminal liability. Also, by
13, KRS § 510.010(4) (1975).
" SaIsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
1,, Brief for Appellee at 4, 565 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (citations omitted).
,, 565 S.W.2d at 639.
"3 KRS § 510.010(4) (1975).
565 S.W.2d at 640.




specifying that the woman must lack capacity to appraise
"the nature" of her conduct, we make it clear that we are not
talking about appraisals involving value judgments or consid-
eration of remote consequences of the immediate acts. The
typical case that remains within the revised clause would be
the case of intercourse with a woman known to the defendant
to be manifestly and seriously deranged.' 7
Thus, the degree of impairment required to satisfy this section
is substantial. This is based on the notion that society is un-
willing to criminally sanction a person who had non-violent
sexual intercourse with another unless that other person is
deemed incapable of giving legal consent.'48 For example, crim-
inal sanctions exist against those who perform sexual acts with
young children, who are regarded as incapable of consenting to
such acts."9
Because rape is traditionally a crime of violence, it is im-
portant to determine the proper threshold of mental capacity
which vitiates consent. A number of states still employ statutes
which require that a victim suffer from a mental disease which
renders her incapable of consenting; ability to consent is itself
the standard.' However, this formulation was rejected by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code "because it provides no
meaningful guide to decision."'51 The Model Penal Code provi-
sion adopted by Kentucky represents an effort to provide such
a "meaningful guide."
Under prior Kentucky law, there was no specific provision
dealing with this situation. A case such as Salsman would have
been considered under the general section covering non-
consensual intercourse.' However, the Kentucky courts had
147 Id.
u4 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4, Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
u The age established as the cut-off for ability to consent vanes among jurisdic-
tions. The Model Penal Code suggests ten years, while the Kentucky statute specifies
twelve years. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.1(1)(d); KRS § 510.040(1)(b)(21) (1975).
11* ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-1401(5)(b) (1977); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-2801 (West)
(1967); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a)(2)
(Smith-Hurd) (1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(3) (Bums) (Cum. Supp. 1978); IowA
CODE ANN. § 709.1(2) (West) (Special Pamphlet 1978); KAN. STAT. § 21-3502(1)(c)
(1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West) (1958); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
3121(4) (Purdon) (1973); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 22-22-1(2) (Special Supp. 1977);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(1) West (Compact Edition 1978).
"' MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.4.
152 KRS § 435.090 (1944) (repealed 1974).
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continued to apply a standard which was derived from a prior
statute that provided criminal sanctions for "carnally knowing
an idiot."'' 3 In Jones v. Commonwealth, "idiot" is defined as
"[a] person destitute of mind from birth, or a person of such
weak and feeble mind existing from birth as renders her incap-
able of knowing right from wrong, or, knowing, has not, by
reason of such mental condition, if any, the will power to re-
sist."'54 Long after the statute construed in Jones was repealed,
this standard was applied to determine whether a person over
the statutory age limit was nevertheless incapable of consent-
ing because of mental defect. The Commentary to the Final
Draft of the Kentucky Penal Code cites this language from
Jones and concludes that the new definition of mentally defec-
tive "does not substantially change prior Kentucky law but
rather states the same abnormality in language employed by
contemporary psychiatry." 5 Thus, "destitute of mind from
infancy" is equated with "incapable of appraising the nature
of [one's] conduct." Common sense rejects this assessment, as
do a number of contemporary psychiatrists.
Dr. Cornelia Wilbur, a Lexington psychoanalyst, posits
that although both standards require severe impairment, they
do not necessarily include persons with similar mental ill-
nesses.' 6 While the Jones standard requires that a person be an
idiot from birth, there are many personality disorders which
manifest themselves later in life but which could come within
the new standard by rendering the person incapable of apprais-
ing her conduct.'57 A Lexington psychiatrist, Dr. Kathleen
Riggs, stresses that it is improper to style the two standards as
the same, with the newer one couched in the language of con-
temporary psychiatry.5 ' She feels there is a great variance be-
"' Ky. Stat. § 1155 (repealed).
"u 159 S.W.568, 569 (Ky. 1913). It is interesting to note that this formulation
describes a condition very much like that required for the modem insanity defense.
See, e.g., the Model Penal Code section discussed in the text accompanying note 168
infra.
"' KENTUCKY PENAL CODE, supra note 76, at § 1100(4).
"'Interview with Cornelia B. Wilbur, M.D., P.S.C., private psycholanalyst, in
Lexington, Ky. (Oct. 11, 1978).
" Id. The Salsman court did not mention the birth factor, and it seems safe to
assume that courts would recognize an impairment occurring later in life.
In Interview with R. Kathleen Riggs, Ph.D., M.D., private psychiatrist, in Lexing-
ton, Ky. (Oct. 11, 1978).
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tween the two even without the birth aspect, as there are a
number of dissociative disorders which affect the ability to
appraise one's own conduct, but stop short of causing complete
mental destitution.159 A third psychiatrist, Dr. William Weitzel
of the faculty of the University of Kentucky Medical Center,
agrees that the standards are far apart in the conditions they
describe. 6' He states that many people become psychotic very
late in life, have temporary illnesses, or experience acute peri-
ods during relatively minor long-term illnesses. ' All of these
are functional disabilities within the new statute, but would
fail to qualify under the Jones standard.
Further, the Commentary provides that the new definition
"means that the person does not know that a sexual act is being
performed. 111 2 This is the language relied upon by the Salsman
court,'63 although such a construction seems to be unsupported.
For example, the statute requires inquiry into whether the vic-
tim can appraise her own conduct. The Commentary, and sub-
sequently the court, have turned this around to require that the
victim not understand the act being performed upon her, i.e.,
asking whether she can appraise her assailant's conduct. The
operative distinction is one between an awareness of what is
happening and an ability to decide what to do about it. Dr.
Wilbur feels it is inappropriate to apply the standard to the
victim's perception of the assailant's conduct, as a woman
would have to be almost unconscious before she would fail to
perceive that a sexual act is being performed.'64 Dr. Riggs adds
that it is really irrelevant in determining whether a person can
properly understand her own actions to consider whether she
understands that a sexual act is being performed upon her.'6 -
According to Dr. Weitzel, even a very young child would be
aware that a sexual act was being performed, but probably
would not be capable of determining what her own responsive
159 Id.
"' Interview with William Weitzel, M.D., psychiatrist and professor, University
of Kentucky Medical Center, in Lexington, Ky. (Oct. 18, 1978).
161 Id.
1 KENTUCKY PENAL CODE, supra note 76, at § 1100(4).
"8 565 S.W.2d at 640.
,' Interview with Dr. Wilbur, supra note 156.
165 Interview with Dr. Riggs, supra note 158.
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conduct should be.'66 In the same way, a mentally retarded
woman may not be destitute of mind or unaware that a sexual
act is being performed. But this does not insure that she does
not suffer from a disease which renders her incapable of making
a reasoned response to unwanted sexual advances. The victim
in Salsman appeared to be such a woman.
It is interesting to note that this distinction between mere
awareness and the ability to rationally respond was drawn by
the Model Penal Code in the section dealing with the mental
state of the accused. An accused is considered "not responsible
for criminal conduct" where the ability "either to appreciate
the criminality of [the] conduct or to conform [the] conduct
to the requirements of law" is lacking. 1 7 Thus, the drafters
realized that "cognitive factors are not the only ones that pre-
clude inhibition; that even though cognition obtains, mental
disorder may produce a total incapacity for self-control."'68 It
is not apparent why the drafters failed to characterize mentally
defective victims of sexual abuse in the same way. The drafters
of the Kentucky Penal Code, however, apparently recognized
the analogy. Immediately after the language relied upon by the
Salsman court, the Commentary states that "[i]n cases of the
mentally ill, there must be a substantially complete loss of
judgment and self control."'' It follows that something more
than a mere awareness that a sexual act is being performed is
necessary to allow the defendant to raise the defense of consent.
It is unclear why this approach, which would be a far more
meaningful construction of the statute, was not adopted by the
court.
A majority of states, including Kentucky, now have stat-
utes dealing with the mentally defective victim of a sexual
offense' ° that are styled after the Model Penal Code. Only ten
" Interview with Dr. Weitzel, supra note 160.
... MdDEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01(l).
"' MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01.
", KENTUCKY PENAL CODE, supra note 76, at § 1100(4) (emphasis added).
70 ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 6-60 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1801(3) (1976); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-403(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CoN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-65(5) (1975);
DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 767(5) (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(b) (1976); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 26-2001 (1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(2) (West) (1978); ME. REv. STAT.
tit. 17-A, § 253(2)(c) (Pamphlet 1978); MD. CraM. LAW CODE ANN. Art. 27, § 461(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1977); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(c) (Supp. 1978-1979); MINN.
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states have common-law rape statutes with no specific provi-
sion on the subject,'7' while eleven have statutes focusing on the
ability of the victim to consent, considering her mental dis-
ease.7 2 As most of the statutes are relatively new, there is little
interpretive law in the area. However, the New York Court of
Appeals recently had occasion to construe the definition of
"mentally defective" for purposes of a third degree rape statute
similar to Kentucky's. 3 In People v. 'Easley, the defendant
challenged the moral issue raised by the trial court's instruc-
tion as to the definition of "mentally defective." In response,
the court stressed that it must be determined whether the vic-
tim was "substantially able to understand what she was
doing.' 74 Further, the court elaborated on the indicia of such
an understanding:
Whether there is an awareness of the social or other cost of
one's conduct is a legitimate area of inquiry in determining
whether one is so mentally defective that the protective
shield of section 130.05 of the Penal Law is invoked. Such
inquiry should of course include the question of whether the
person whose mentality is being judged has insight into the
'"consequences" or conduct for which the law exacts criminal
penalties.
But that is not enough. The law does not mirror all pre-
vailing moral standards. . . .Therefore, there also needs to
be inquiry as to whether there is a capacity to appraise the
STAT. ANN. § 609.341(6) (West) (Supp. 1978); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 566.040(1) (Vernon)
(Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-2-101(28) (Supp. 1977); NEB. Rav. STAT. §
28-319 (Supp. 1977); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.366 (1973); N.C. REv. STAT. ANN. §
632.1(I)(d) (Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-20(A)(4) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 130.00(5) (McKinney) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(e) (Supp. 1977);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(2) (Page) (1975); OR. Rav. STAT. § 163.305(3) (1977);
S.C. CODE § 16-3-651(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977); Tx. PEAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.02(b)(4)
(Vernon) (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254(2)(A) (Supp. 1978); WASH. RaV.
CODE § 9.79.40(3) (1976); W.VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(3) (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.225(2)(c) (Supp. 1978-1979); Wyo. STAT. § 6-63.2(a)(iv) (Interim Supp. 1977).
M7! ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.120 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1978); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 265, § 22 (Michie/Law Co-op) (Cum. Supp. 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
65 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (West) (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3701
(1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (1977); VA. CODE § 18.261 (1975).
In See note 150 supra for a list of jurisdictions with statutes of this kind.
"' People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).
"I, See note 136 supra for the operative language of the statute.
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nature of the stigma, the ostracism or other noncriminal
sanctions which society levies for conduct it labels only as
immoral even while it "struggles to make itself articulate in
law." .... Put in terms of this case, in its determination of
[the victim's] capacity to appraise the sexual act, its signifi-
cance and its consequences, the jury may very well have been
required to consider the "moral quality" of the act as it would
be measured by society and to assess as well her ability to
appreciate that fact .... 175
The New York court recognized that such a statute cannot
be meaningfully implemented by limiting its application to the
single consideration of whether the victim is aware that an
unlawful act is being performed. It is the victim's ability to
appreciate the quality of her own actions which is at issue, and
this demands inquiry into a broad range of physiological as well
as more subtle psychological factors. If the law is to presume
some persons incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse, it
must be on the basis of that person's inability to evaluate the
situation and make a reasoned response. The defense of con-
sent should not be allowed merely because the victim recog-
nizes that a sexual act is being performed. There are many
factors which must be considered to determine whether there
is a "substantially complete loss of judgment and self-
control.""'6
The victim in SaIsman was found to be free from mental
defect as a matter of law. As a result, the jury was instructed
only on rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first
degree, and found the defendant guilty of the lesser crime. 77
This occurred in spite of the fact that the intercourse was ad-
mitted. Because the jury found forcible compulsion, the third
degree rape crime was clearly proved. 78 The jury was appar-
ently reluctant to find this defendant guilty of first degree rape
where the force used was minimal and the victim's mental
M' 364 N.E.2d at 1332-33.
'' See text accompanying note 169 supra for a discussion of this standard.
17 565 S.W.2d at 639.
' The defendant argued on appeal that the sexual abuse instruction constituted
reversible error. Appellant's Brief at 7-8, 565 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978): The
defendant's argument would have left the jury in the position of either finding the
defendant guilty of first degree rape or not guilty of any crime. This would be a clearly
unsatisfactory result in the instant case.
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state was at issue. The proper decision would have been
reached if the court had instructed the jury as to third degree
rape and allowed it to determine whether or not the victim was
able to respond rationally to the defendant's sexual ad-
vances.
17 1
11 Both rape in the third degree and sexual abuse in the first degree are Class D
felonies, so the potential penalty would be identical. KRS §§ 510.060(2), .110(1)(a)
(1975).
